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Leaving women behind: The application of evidence-based guidelines, law, 
and obstetric violence by omission 
Camilla Pickles 
Introduction 
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) statement on disrespect and abuse during childbirth 
helped to bring much needed global attention to the fact that healthcare professionals are 
subjecting pregnant and birthing women to various forms of disrespect and abuse.1 
Disrespectful and abusive treatment includes physical and verbal abuse, profound humiliation, 
coercive or unconsented medical procedures, lack of confidentiality, failure to get fully 
informed consent, refusal to give pain medication, gross violations of privacy, refusal of 
admission to health facilities, and neglecting women during childbirth.2 The WHO, together 
with other leading maternal health organisations,3 and obstetric violence activists and 
researchers actively support and encourage the provision of evidence-based care to tackle abuse 
and obstetric violence.4 
 
Evidence-based guidelines use ‘the best available research on the safety and effectiveness of 
specific practices to help guide maternity care decisions and facilitate optimal outcomes for 
mothers and their newborns.’5 These provide the necessary framework to prevent the extreme 
situations of doing ‘too little, too late’ or ‘too much, too soon’ which both lead to harmful 
                                            
1 World Health Organization, ‘The Prevention and Elimination of Disrespect and Abuse During Facility-based 
Childbirth’ (2014) 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/134588/WHO_RHR_14.23_eng.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 6 
June 2018. 
2 ibid. 
3 These organisations are listed on the World Heath Organization’s website, 
<www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/maternal_perinatal/endorsers.pdf> accessed 6 June 2018. 
4 Simone Grilo Diniz and others, ‘Abuse and Disrespect in Childbirth Care as a Public Health Issue in Brazil: 
Origins, Definitions, Impacts on Maternal Health, and Proposals for its Prevention’ (2015) 25 J Hum Growth Dev 
377; Michelle Sadler and others, ‘Moving Beyond Disrespect and Abuse: Addressing the Structural Dimensions 
of Obstetric Violence’ (2016) 24(47) Reprod Health Matters 47. 
5 Carol Sakala and Maureen P Corry, ‘Evidence-based Maternity Care: What it is and What it can Achieve’ (2008) 
<www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/maternal-health/evidence-based-maternity-care.pdf> 21 accessed 
6 June 2018. 
outcomes for women.6 In essence, evidence-based guidelines help determine when a procedure 
is clinically indicated and clinical indication helps to distinguish between those procedures 
which should be promoted or avoided.7 Evidence-based care offers several benefits, including 
improved quality of care, improved clinical decision-making, and improved support for 
patients’ informed decision-making processes.8 Guidelines ensure consistency of care, improve 
efficiency of healthcare services, facilitate standardisation of good practice, and help to contain 
costs.9 
 
Activists rely on evidence-based guidelines to counter established practices that render 
childbirth a pathological event. Guidelines issued by the WHO and the International Federation 
of Gynecology and Obstetrics played a leading role in shaping some of the obstetric violence 
laws found in Latin America.10 According to Bellón Sánchez the WHO’s guidelines ‘are a 
source of authoritative knowledge in the field of childbirth assistance that activists groups in 
different parts of the world use as a tool to claim more respectful healthcare assistance for 
women’.11 Thus, they help to dismantle abusive maternity care in jurisdictions where there are 
no obstetric violence laws proscribing violence against women during childbirth. 
 
While I accept that evidence-based guidelines help to improve maternity care services, I 
question whether their application will always support the fight against abuse during pregnancy 
and childbirth. I take the position that pregnancy and childbirth should never be the reason for 
any woman to experience humiliation, degradation, or any form of human rights violation. This 
                                            
6 Suellen Miller and others, ‘Beyond too Little, too Late and too Much, too Soon: A Pathway Towards Evidence-
Based, Respectful Maternity Care Worldwide’ (2016) 388.10056 The Lancet 2176. 
7 ibid. 
8 Steven H Woolf and others, ‘Potential Benefits, Limitations, and Harms of Clinical Guidelines’ (1999) 
318(7182) BMJ 527. 
9 ibid. 
10 Silvia Bellón Sánchez, ‘Obstetric Violence: Medicalization, Authority Abuse and Sexism within Spanish 
Obstetric Assistance: A New Name for Old Issues’ (Masters Dissertation, Utrecht University 2014) 49; Carlos 
Alejandro Herrera Vacaflor, ‘Obstetric Violence in Argentina: A Study on the Legal Effects of Medical Guidelines 
and Statutory Obligations for Improving the Quality of Maternal Health’ (Masters Dissertation, University of 
Toronto 2015) 32. 
11 Sánchez (n 10) 49. 
premise demands from us that responses to abuse during childbirth should be such that no 
woman is left behind or side-lined during the implementation of interventions which are aimed 
at improving maternity care services. Further, interventions should be such that women can use 
them to advance their interests. We are therefore required to review critically whether 
interventions are adequately inclusive and accessible, bearing in mind that women are diverse, 
their needs are diverse, and their voices in relation to pregnancy and birth are many. 
 
I draw from women’s lived experiences of obstetric-related care to show how scientifically 
sound12 evidence-based guidelines are applied in a way that silences and excludes some women 
from care. This process can be harmful to their psychological integrity but guidelines 
invisiblise these violations because there is an assumption that evidence-based care does not 
harm. Thereafter, I will expose the anomaly that while evidence-based guidelines are said to 
be developed for women’s benefit, a woman cannot use the law to compel a healthcare provider 
to comply with guidelines when she wants access to those benefits, or to compel a healthcare 
provider to disregard guidelines when she does not want access to benefits. Finally, I 
demonstrate that, in these instances, evidence-based guidelines facilitate obstetric violence by 
omission. This underscores an overlooked concern that even the most well developed evidence-
based guidelines may leave some women behind. I argue that an obstetric violence perspective 
helps to clarify this harm, it declares this harm an unacceptable consequence of evidence-based 
care, and it supports demands for more respectful application of guidelines. 
Evidence-based guidelines silence and exclude some women  
On 24 May 2017, Birthrights launched its ‘Maternal Request Caesarean Campaign’.13 The 
Campaign recognises that there is a small group of women who feel that having a planned 
caesarean section is the right option for them given their circumstances but that they are 
experiencing barriers regarding access to care. It identified Oxford University Hospitals NHS 
                                            
12 I assume that the guidelines are methodologically sound, and the purpose of this chapter is not to argue that the 
guidelines referred to herein are incorrect. 
13 Maria Booker, ‘Do I Have a Right to a C-Section? Update on Oxford University Hospitals’ (21 July 2017) 
<www.birthrights.org.uk/2017/07/do-i-have-a-right-to-a-c-section-update-on-oxford-university-hospitals/> 
accessed 6 June 2018.  
as one of the Trusts enforcing a policy of not providing caesarean sections on request.14 I draw 
from existing guidelines and recommendations, and communications between Birthrighs and 
the Trust to illustrate how healthcare professionals use highly regarded guidelines to silence 
some women and justify their exclusion from care. This discussion will not consider women’s 
decision-making process in relation to elective caesarean sections and the complexity of 
autonomy and ‘true choice’ in the context of broader social and cultural experiences.15 Instead, 
I focus on how healthcare professionals apply guidelines to women’s requests for access to 
care that is not clinically indicated. 
 
Childbirth by way of caesarean section is the subject of evidence-based guidelines or 
recommendations at international and national levels. At an international level, the most 
influential caesarean-section recommendation originates from the WHO. In 2015, the WHO 
confirmed its position that the ideal rate for caesarean sections is between ten per cent and 15 
per cent.16 Drawing from the latest available evidence-based data it reiterated that caesarean 
sections are effective in saving lives but only when ‘they are required for medically indicated 
reasons’ or when ‘medically necessary’. This seems to establish a presumption in favour of 
vaginal childbirth that requires of women to make a positive case for access to caesarean 
sections. While the WHO emphasises the need for caesarean section decision-making to 
revolve around what is medically indicated, national guidelines take a more nuanced approach. 
 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has issued clinical guidelines 
for the provision of caesarean sections that also draws from available evidence to guide when 
caesarean sections are clinically indicated, but it supports a women-centred approach.17 A 
women-centred approach concerns care that is directed by a woman’s needs and preferences, 
                                            
14 More Trusts are implicated, see Birthrights, ‘Maternal Request Caesarean’ (2018) 
<http://www.birthrights.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Final-Birthrights-MRCS-Report-
2108.pdf> accessed 30 April 2019. 
15 For a discussion of the complexity of ‘choosing’ caesarean sections, see Katherine Beckett, ‘Choosing Cesarean: 
Feminism and the Politics of Childbirth in the United States’ (2005) 6 Fem T 251. 
16 World Heath Organization, ‘Statement on Caesarean Section Rates’ (2015) 
<www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/maternal_perinatal_health/cs-statement/en/> accessed 6 June 
2018. 
17 NICE, ‘Caesarean Section: Clinical Guideline’ (2011) <www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg132> accessed 6 June 
2018. 
and it requires healthcare providers to offer evidence-based information and support to enable 
informed decision-making. The guideline requires healthcare providers to engage meaningfully 
with women who elect to give birth by way of a caesarean section. They are required to discuss 
reasons for the election, and the risks and benefits of the procedure. The healthcare provider 
should offer perinatal mental health support if a woman requests a caesarean section on the 
grounds of anxiety. The guideline directs healthcare providers to offer a planned caesarean 
section if a vaginal birth is still not an option after discussion and additional support. However, 
it recognises that a woman cannot compel an obstetrician to provide an elective caesarean 
where clinical indication is absent. The attending obstetrician is required to refer the woman to 
another obstetrician who will carry out the caesarean section. 
 
The Oxford University Hospitals Trust’s patient information leaflet on access to elective 
caesarean sections explains that the Trust does not make provision for maternal requests for 
caesarean sections because it only provides caesarean sections in cases where there are clinical 
indications supporting their use.18 Healthcare professionals will refer women to another 
hospital in cases where they choose to go ahead with a caesarean section after being offered or 
receiving support regarding mode of birth.19 The leaflet offers a rather inflexible approach and 
it is not clear if all women requesting caesarean sections will always be referred to another 
hospital. According to Birthrights20 this approach to maternal requests for caesarean sections 
is not in line with the NICE guidelines and blanket policies of this nature are ‘a violation of a 
Trust’s legal duty to give personalised care’ as confirmed in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board.21 According to Lady Hale: 
 
                                            
18 Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust, ‘I am Anxious about Giving Birth and Want to Know More about 
Caesarean Section’ (2014) <www.ouh.nhs.uk/patient-guide/leaflets/files/10405Pcaesarean.pdf> accessed 6 June 
2018. 
19 ibid. 
20 Birthrights, ‘Campaigns: Our Maternal Request Campaign’ (2017) <www.birthrights.org.uk/campaigns/> 
accessed 6 June 2018. 
21 [2016] CSOH 133. 
[A] patient is entitled to take into account her own values, her own assessment of the comparative 
merits of giving birth the ‘natural’ way and of giving birth by caesarean section, whatever medical 
opinion may say, alongside the medical evaluation of the risks to herself and her baby.22 
 
Putting aside the issue that the Trust may be applying a blanket approach in relation to women’s 
requests,23 the Trust’s approach is aligned with the WHO’s recommendations and with the 
NICE guidelines in so far as access to caesarean sections is being denied because there is no 
clinical indication justifying this mode of childbirth. This scenario exposes some concerning 
consequences of the application of evidence-based guidelines: The Campaign reveals that 
women’s voices are directly and indirectly silenced because of the application of guidelines 
and guidelines being applied in this way legitimise women’s exclusion from care. This process 
can cause serious harm to women’s psychological integrity, but these are rendered invisible 
and ignored because the harms occur while providing evidence-based care. 
 
According to Mainz, clinical indicators are based on standards of care that are evidence-based 
as derived from scientific evidence or are derived from academic literature and expert panels 
of healthcare providers when scientific evidence is lacking.24 Thus, ‘clinical indicators’ are 
narrowly defined and do not include factors that some women may consider to be important 
for their well-being during pregnancy and birth. Evidence-based guidelines can work to silence 
women when they are applied in contexts where there is a history of devaluing women in 
maternity care25 because their adoption may merely support a shift in deference from one type 
of expert knowledge to another.26 This process excludes and devalues women’s knowledge 
                                            
22 ibid [115]. 
23 This is disputed. Birthrights have reports from women that they are denied access to caesarean sections without 
meaningful engagement while the Trust alleges that it does offer the support required by the NICE guidelines. 
24 Jan Mainz, ‘Defining and Classifying Clinical Indicators for Quality Improvement’ (2003) 15 IJQHC 523, 524. 
25 Sheila Kitzinger, Birth and Sex: The Power and The Passion (Pinter and Martin 2012) 84-100; Henci Goer, 
‘Cruelty in Maternity Wards: Fifty Years Later’ (2010) 19 J Perinat Educ 33; Beverley Chalmers, ‘Changing 
Childbirth in Eastern Europe: Which Systems of Authoritative Knowledge Should Prevail?’ in Robbie E Davis-
Floyd and Carolyn F Sargent (eds), Childbirth and Authoritative Knowledge: Cross-Cultural Perspectives 
(University of California Press 1997) 226-273; Norman Morris, ‘Human Relations in Obstetric Practice’ (1960) 
275 The Lancet 913. 
26 Elizabeth Kukura, ‘Contested Care: The Limitations of Evidence-Based Maternity Care Reform’ (2016) 31 
Berkeley J Gend Law Just 241, 286. 
rooted in their lived experiences and can overlook them as important sources of knowledge. 
The Trust’s inflexible reverence for professional and scientific knowledge undermines women 
as autonomous decision-makers.27 
 
Some evidence based-guidelines may indirectly silence women because they tend to speak to 
general populations and are not primarily concerned with individuality. This is the WHO’s 
approach to caesarean sections and the Trust seems to support this. A generalised view has the 
effect of framing all women as one type of woman. This leaves little room for the consideration 
of other aspects relevant to care such as a woman’s individual life experiences, preferences, 
fears, expectations, and personal perceptions of control and life circumstances.28 Women exist 
beyond realms of ‘clinical indication’ and they are diverse. Beckett reminds us that ‘women 
can and do find obstetric technology to be an empowering experience’29 but some women view 
technological interventions as something to actively avoid too. Thus, the NICE guidelines and 
the WHO recommendations speak to, and facilitate, only one of many ways a woman may need 
to birth, and their application needs to be individualised by the Trust. 
 
The unimportant role of women’s voices in relation to determining what care is necessary for 
their self-determined needs creates the situation where healthcare professionals use evidence-
based guidelines to justifiably exclude women from care. The Oxford University Hospitals 
Trust adopts this approach. It presents elective caesarean sections as placing patients at risk 
that violates patient trust and frustrates the Trust’s ability to fulfil their duties as doctors.30 In 
                                            
27 Kukura (n 26) 289. Stereotyping of this nature is ever-present in reproductive care. See, Rebecca J Cook and 
Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 
2010); Rebecca J Cook, Simone Cusack, and Bernard M Dickens, ‘Unethical Female Stereotyping in 
Reproductive Health’ (2010) 109 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 255; C Pickles, ‘Sounding the Alarm: Government of the 
Republic of Namibia v LM and Women’s Rights during Childbirth in South Africa’ (2018) PER (in press). 
28 For instance, see Ellen Lazarus, ‘What do Women Want? Issues of Choice, Control, and Class in American 
Pregnancy and Childbirth’ in Robbie E Davis-Floyd and Carolyn F Sargent (eds), Childbirth and Authoritative 
Knowledge: Cross Cultural Perspectives (University of California Press 1997) 132; Soo Downe and others, ‘What 
Matters to Women during Childbirth: A Systematic Qualitative Review’ (2018) 13(4) PLoS ONE e0194906. 
29 Beckett (n 15) 259. 
30 Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust (n 18) 4. 
its correspondence with Birthrights,31 the Trust explained that its approach is not driven by the 
need to meet targets, but that caesarean sections are being denied on the basis that there is no 
clinical indication for their use and that the Trust’s decision is related to good practice and to 
reducing short and long-term harm to women. It recognised that some women express a fear 
of birth or have had a poor birth experience but that these factors do not mean that a caesarean 
section is ‘the best option’.32 The Trust asserted that it complies with all the relevant guidelines 
because it offers support to those women who request caesarean sections procedures but that 
‘if no clinical indication is found despite a thorough assessment, then the woman is referred to 
an Obstetrician in a neighbouring Trust who may support her request.’33 It is noteworthy that 
the Trust did not include rationing of maternity care service as part of its decision to deny 
access to caesarean sections on request. While the Trust has not specifically referenced the 
WHO recommendations, it quite clearly reflects the WHO’s position because it justifies its 
position on the grounds that caesarean sections come with risks and obstetricians should not 
subject women and their babies to any unnecessary risk.34  
 
Exclusion from care leaves women with very little options and it introduces unique concerns 
for women because pregnancy is time sensitive. According to Birthrights, women’s referrals 
to other Trusts are being refused because of caseload implications and other Trusts are not 
offering maternal request caesareans ‘in order not to become targets for women refused this 
choice by Oxford’.35 Further, securing care elsewhere may require women to travel long 
distances, bear burdensome cost implications for accommodation for relatives, or may result 
in a very isolated birth when accommodation for others cannot be secured. At times women 
are left with very little time to make necessary arrangements because some Trusts reject 
                                            
31 Oxford University Hospitals Trust replying letter to Birthrights, <www.birthrights.org.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Letter-to-R-Schiller-Birthrights-from-OUH.pdf> accessed 6 June 2018. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust (n 18) 4. 
35 Birthrights replying letter to Oxford University Hospitals Trust, <www.birthrights.org.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Second-letter-to-OUH-with-case-studies.docx> accessed 6 June 2018. 
requests for caesarean sections late in gestation.36 Rejection is also very disrespectful. One 
woman recounts how she felt as though healthcare providers treated her like a ‘child being told 
off for doing something wrong’ and how her attending healthcare provider refused to listen to 
her concerns and reasons for the request.37 Another woman expressed frustration about the fact 
that healthcare providers are not prepared to ‘credit women with the capacity to make informed 
decisions regarding risks which are acceptable to her.’38 
 
One can argue that the Oxford University Hospitals Trust is compelling or forcing women to 
experience the physiological process of vaginal birth because the Trust is actively denying 
women access to an alternative mode of childbirth that is available at the facility. Women who 
were denied access to caesarean sections reported experiencing nightmares and sleeplessness, 
and feeling lonely, frightened, anxious, stressed, and being filled with dread while trying to 
secure access to a caesarean section during their pregnancies.39 Furthermore, evidence reveals 
that women experience traumatic births in cases where they feel that they lacked autonomy and 
control, where they were denied access to a particular intervention, and when healthcare 
providers did not provide the necessary support.40 These harms point to the fact that Trusts are 
compromising women’s psychological integrity in rather fundamental ways. Their harms are 
invisiblised because evidence-based care is presented by the Trust as being the mechanism to 
prevent harms during childbirth. The process of invisiblising these harms allows the Trust to 
authoritatively assert that it is well-positioned to determine ‘the best option’ and the privileging 
of medical authority allows the Trust to assert that it is best placed to reduce short and long-
term harms. 





40 Cheryl Tatano Beck, ‘Birth Trauma: In the Eye of the Beholder’ (2004) 53 Nurs Res 28; Rachel Harris and 
Susan Ayers, ‘What Makes Labour and Birth Traumatic? A Survey of Intrapartum “Hotspots”’ (2012) 27 Psychol 
Health 1166; M H Hollander and others, ‘Preventing Traumatic Childbirth Experiences: 2192 Women’s 
Perceptions and Views’ (2017) 20 Arch Womens Ment Health 515. 
Limited value of guidelines in law 
The discussion to follow will show that a woman cannot compel a provider to comply with 
evidence-based guidelines to gain access to its benefits and a woman cannot compel a 
healthcare provider to disregard the guidelines when she does not want the benefits it has on 
offer. This is the situation taking place in relation to the Oxford University Hospitals Trust. For 
women to gain access to caesarean sections they need to be able to compel an obstetrician to 
comply with a portion of the NICE guidelines and to compel the obstetrician to ignore the 
WHO recommendations. 
 
Courts have accepted the authoritative nature of clinical guidelines as far as they are ‘evidence 
of good medical practice’.41 Various healthcare providers have been found negligent for failing 
to comply with clinical guidelines,42 but this is not a given. In KR v Lanarkshire Health 
Board,43 Lord Brailsford explains that guidelines ‘are the result of deliberation by panels of 
experts who will have regard in formulating them to available scientific information and their 
own collective experience. The result of that process are documents which are intended to 
provide clinical guidance, not set down mandatory rules.’44 Courts accept that slavish 
adherence to guidelines should be avoided45 and their application should be determined by a 
healthcare provider’s appreciation of her or his own level of knowledge and experience.46 This 
means that a more experienced provider may deviate from guidelines when her or his extensive 
clinical experience and knowledge indicate this may be necessary.47 A less experienced 
healthcare provider, who lacks the necessary knowledge and experience, is required to follow 
the guidelines since these represent distilled experience of other healthcare providers that this 
                                            
41 Smith v National Health Service Litigation [2001] Lloyd's Rep Med 90. 
42 For instance see, CP v Lanarkshire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] SCOH 142; DF v Healthcare NHS Trust 
[2005] EWHC 1327. 
43 [2016] CSOH 133 [129]. 
44 ibid. 
45 Montgomery (n 21) [203]. 
46 KR (n 43) [129]. 
47 ibid. 
healthcare provider lacks.48 This does not mean that they are compelled to comply with the 
guidelines, it means that the inexperienced healthcare providers should consult their more 
experience colleagues in cases where the application of guidelines is deemed inappropriate.49 
 
Patients cannot enforce guidelines. Instead, courts adopt a flexible approach that tends to draw 
from and favour medical knowledge and experience as the guide to determine the justifiability 
of their application or deviation therefrom. Essentially, in this narrow context, the courts 
maintain the privileged position of medical knowledge. Medical knowledge and experience 
establish guidelines and medical knowledge and experience are leading points of reference 
when courts seek to establish when deviation or compliance is justified. It is not overtly clear 
how much room is available to accommodate considerations deemed important to women that 
are not orientated around medical considerations, strictly construed. The current approach will 
do little to support women who seek to enforce one set of guidelines over another, particularly 
when one set of guidelines promote the consideration of what women may deem necessary 
(NICE guidelines) over what the medical profession deems necessary (WHO 
recommendations). The patient-centred approach supported in Montgomery may help to 
dismantle the privileged position of medical knowledge in the context of care during pregnancy 
and childbirth. 
 
The Supreme Court recognised that a number of fundamental developments have taken place 
in society, medical practice and the law, and these developments demand a change in the way 
that patients are cared for.50 These developments include the fact that the patient/doctor 
relationship has evolved into one where patients are recognised as rights bearers; that access to 
information debunks the flawed assumptions that patients are medically uninformed and 
incapable of understanding medical-related matters; and that professional guidance encourages 
patient’s informed involvement when making decisions about treatment.51 Developments in 
law include the recognition of important common law values and rights such as self-
                                            
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 Montgomery (n 21) [75]. 
51 ibid [75]-[79]. 
determination and respect for private life.52 These important values and rights support the 
recognition of a duty to involve patients in decision-making relating to their care and 
treatment.53 
 
Collectively, these developments counter the legitimacy of medical paternalism and support a 
patient/doctor relationship where patients are treated as ‘adults who are capable of 
understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve risk, accepting 
responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences 
of their choices.’54 This translates into two important consequences. First, a healthcare provider 
is under a duty to ensure that a patient is aware of material risks inherent in treatment.55 Second, 
a patient is entitled to decide whether not to incur that risk and the court recognises that the 
decision to incur risk may be informed by non-medical considerations.56 The Supreme Court 
supports an understanding of risk that is patient-sensitive and the materiality of risk is not 
merely determined with reference to percentages. A patient-sensitive approach requires the 
healthcare provider to consider how the risk will affect the life of that individual patient if it 
were to materialise and ‘the importance to the patient of the benefits to be achieved by the 
treatment’.57 
 
Montgomery certainly helps to challenge medical paternalism.58 Lady Hale proclaims, ‘Gone 
are the days when it was thought that, on becoming pregnant, a woman lost, not only her 
                                            
52 ibid [80]. 
53 ibid [80]. See also Jonathan Herring and others, ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice? Montgomery, Patients’ Values, 
and Balanced Decision Making in Person-Centred Clinical Care’ (2017) 25 Med Law Rev 582.  
54 Montgomery (n 21) [81]. 
55 ibid [82]. 
56 ibid [82]. 
57 ibid [89]. 
58 cf, Jonathan Montgomery and Elsa Montgomery, ‘Montgomery on Informed Consent: An Expert Decision’ 
(2016) 42 J Med Ethics 89. 
capacity, but also her right to act as a genuinely autonomous human being.’59 It establishes that 
clinical considerations are not the only factors relevant to decision-making about care options. 
It effectively gives legal weight to patient’s personal perceptions of risk and the types of risk 
they would be willing to carry. From this perspective, women may be able to challenge the 
Trust’s position that its approach is driven by the need to avoid long and short-term harms, 
since risk of harms is seemingly being determined without the consideration of individual 
women’s needs and what they perceive as risks worth taking in relation to their childbirth. It 
also helps to dispel the Oxford University Hospital’s Trust’s notion that there is only one ‘best 
option’ and that this option should be followed because the Trust declares it the best one 
available. Montgomery allows us to recognise that the ‘best option’ approach may come with 
risks that some women are not prepared to face, and they are entitled to avoid that risk. 
 
It is noteworthy that Montgomery secures the right to information to make informed decisions 
that are patient specific, and it establishes a duty on healthcare providers to facilitate that 
process. However, it does not obligate healthcare providers to ensure the realisation of those 
decisions. Lady Hale recognises this limitation; she states a woman cannot ‘force her doctor to 
offer treatment which he or she considers futile or inappropriate. But she is at least entitled to 
the information which will enable her to take a proper part in that decision.’60 Aintree confirms 
that a patient cannot demand treatment from a healthcare provider if that treatment is not 
clinically indicated.61 Clinical indication reappears, and it works to limit severely women’s 
ability to secure an experience of childbirth shaped by the autonomous and informed decisions 
that Montgomery secures. What good is it to be part of the decision-making process when the 
decision reached is one that does not need to be respected? 
 
This discussion reveals that evidence-based guidelines, which are developed for the benefit of 
women, do not necessarily benefit all women in practice. Some women experience harms 
because of their application, and this needs deeper interrogation and analysis. I argue that this 
                                            
59 Montgomery (n 21) [116]. 
60 ibid [115]. 
61 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Trust Foundation v James [2013] UKSC 67 [18]. 
scenario is not merely an issue of compliance with guidelines; it is a form of violence against 
women. 
Obstetric violence by omission 
Jewkes and Penn-Kekana argue that abuse during childbirth is in fact a subset of violence 
against women.62 They explain: 
The essential feature of violence against women is that it stems from structural 
gender inequality, i.e., women’s subordinate position in society as compared to men. 
This systematically devalues the lives of women and girls and thus enables the 
inappropriately low allocation of resources to maternity care that is found in many 
countries. It also disempowers women and enables the use of violence against 
them.63 
According to Jewkes and Penn-Kekana, there are many lessons that can be learned from 
research on violence against women, especially when developing and evaluating policies and 
interventions.64 They are on point. Obstetric violence activists established the importance of a 
violence perspective many years before Jewkes and Penn-Kekana published their comment, 
and I will draw from their contributions here. 
 
I adopt a violence perceptive to argue that healthcare providers or Trusts commit acts of 
obstetric violence by omission when they employ evidence-based guidelines to deny women 
access to non-clinically indicated care, knowing that this denial of care will cause an 
infringement of women’s psychological integrity. I support this argument by considering how 
obstetric violence is currently conceptualised in law and broader activism, and I build on this 
concept by drawing from Bufacchi’s definition of violence.65 
 
                                            
62 Rachel Jewkes and Loveday Penn-Kekana, ‘Mistreatment of Women in Childbirth: Time for Action on the 
Important Dimension of Violence against Women’ (2015) 12(6) PLOS Med e1001849. 
63 ibid, (footnote omitted). 
64 ibid. 
65 Vittorio Bufacchi, Violence and Social Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 13. 
‘Obstetric violence’ originates from Latin America.66 The concept has grown in popularity 
among many activists and researchers who demand reform of the overly medicalised and 
violent nature of some maternity care services. It is a term employed to name the ‘malaise that 
many women feel after childbirth, even though society tells them that everything is alright and 
all that is important is that the baby is alive.’67 ‘Obstetric violence’ calls out unnecessary and 
improper use of medicine against women and their bodies, and it locates these practices within 
a broader framework of historical and ingoing social inequality related to gender, race and 
class: ‘How women are treated in labour and birth, mirrors how they are treated in society in 
general.’68 An obstetric violence perspective demonstrates that disrespect and abuse during 
childbirth are indicators of embedded harmful attitudes towards women and their bodies.69 
These attitudes privilege medical knowledge and allow healthcare providers to enforce 
women’s silence and compliance, and they support the imposition of routine interventions on 
women without consultation, informed consent, and clinical need.70 
 
It is notable that ‘obstetric violence’ is not defined with reference to existing definitions of 
violence more generally. Those researchers or activists who position themselves in relation to 
a definition tend to draw from the art 15 of the Venezuelan Organic Law on the Right of 
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Women to a Life Free from Violence (2007).71 It defines obstetric violence as the appropriation 
of women’s bodies and reproductive processes by health personnel which brings with it a loss 
of autonomy and the ability to decide freely about their bodies and sexuality, and which has a 
negative impact on the quality of women’s lives.72 It recognises that obstetric violence is 
expressed as ‘dehumanised treatment’, ‘abuse of medication’, and it includes within its scope 
the process of converting the physiological process of childbirth into a pathological event.73 
 
The Organic Law appears to promote a wide conceptualisation of obstetric violence. Arguably, 
any obstetric-related conduct that takes place in relation to a woman and her body during 
childbirth without her informed consent could constitute obstetric violence provided that it 
amounts to an appropriation of her body or that it denies her the ability to make decisions 
during this time. However, art 51 narrows this broad definition because it primarily focuses on 
preventing acts that pathologise childbirth. Article 51 of the Organic Law recognises that the 
following closed list of conduct constitutes obstetric violence: A failure to give effective 
attention to obstetric emergencies; forcing women to give birth in the supine position when the 
necessary means to give birth in a vertical position are available; preventing mother/child 
bonding and breastfeeding; altering the natural childbirth process by using acceleration 
techniques without voluntary and informed consent; performing a caesarean section without 
informed consent and when vaginal childbirth is possible. 
 
D’Gregorio, an obstetrician from Venezuela, confirms that ‘obstetric violence’ is a narrowly 
construed concept in Venezuelan Law. He explains that the Organic Law emphasises that 
‘medication should only be used when it is indicated, the natural processes should be respected, 
and instrumental or surgical procedures should be performed only when the indication follows 
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evidence-based medicine.’74 Thus, while the need for informed consent features (promoting 
women’s autonomy), the focal point of the obstetric violence articles relate to preventing the 
use of medical interventions that are not clinically indicated and to ensure a more humanised 
approach to childbirth which supports childbirth as a physiological process. Similarly, Sánchez, 
who studied obstetric violence activism in Spain, interprets obstetric violence laws as 
promoting the notion that ‘pregnancy does not have to be considered a pathology, but a 
“natural” process’.75 She recognises that obstetric violence laws demand that healthcare 
providers recognise that women are not ill and are capable of making informed decisions 
regarding their care during labour and childbirth but it seems that these considerations are 
relevant in contexts where woman are looking to avoid medicalised childbirths. 
 
‘Obstetric violence’ is a helpful concept despite its narrow construction in law. It contextualises 
violence against women within the obstetric care environment, it demystifies how and why this 
violence occurs, it helps women articulate the harm they experience during labour and 
childbirth, and it works to challenge medical privilege by obligating healthcare providers to 
justify normalised and routinised conduct. However, the above application of the concept of 
obstetric violence creates the perception that this form of violence only concerns healthcare 
provider conduct that is disrespectful of the physiological process of childbirth or conduct (in 
the form of medical interventions) which is not clinically indicated and evidence-based. I argue 
that this conceptualisation of obstetric violence is far too narrow, and it overlooks many acts 
of violence that can occur in the obstetric care context.76 Further, it does not reveal how 
healthcare professional subject women to violence while undergoing necessitated medicalised 
childbirths. This approach has the consequence of narrowing the potential for critical review 
and response. 
 
Support for such a narrow construction of obstetric violence may lie in the fact that the concept 
of violence is not fully understood, or it may simply be a consequence of the fact that there is 
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no accepted definition of violence, and that it is an ambiguous concept that tends to be moulded 
by different people who adopt different perspectives.77 Bufacchi tackles this issue. He argues 
that the definition of violence should be fix and not fluid and he offers a definition that may 
help to develop a universally applicable conceptualisation of violence.78 
 
In the main, violence is defined either very narrowly or too comprehensively.79 A narrow 
definition of violence defines it as an intentional act of excessive physical force used to cause 
suffering or injury.80 This approach fails to recognise the fact that violence can cause emotional 
and psychological suffering;81 that it can take place indirectly through institution structures and 
agencies;82 and it not aligned with definitions of violence found in international and regional 
laws.83 This demonstrates that there is a need for a more inclusive construction of violence and 
there is broader support for this approach. A comprehensive definition of violence frames 
violence as a ‘violation of rights’.84 While this offers a more inclusive approach, it is criticised 
as being too comprehensive because ‘almost any act can be said to violate someone’s rights, 
making violence ubiquitous and therefore meaningless.’85 
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Bufacchi attempts to overcome the above issue. According to Bufacchi: 
[A]n act of violence occurs when the right to integrity or unity of a subject (person 
or animal) or object (property) is being intentionally or unintentionally violated as 
a result of an action or an omission. The violation may occur at a physical or 
psychological level, through physical or psychological means. A violation of 
integrity will usually result in the subject being harmed or injured, or the object 
being destroyed or damaged.86 
Bufacchi’s definition locates violence in the violation of the right to integrity and not all human 
rights. Violence concerns the process of being reduced to a lesser being in physical and/or 
psychological terms.87 He focuses on the consequence of conduct (violation of integrity) and 
looks at an incident from the perspective of the victim. This approach supports the argument 
that both acts and omissions can constitute violence since both hold the potential to cause a 
violation of integrity as a consequence thereof. However, Bufacchi explains that an omission 
can only legitimately amount to violence if two elements are present: Foreseeability and 
alternativity.88 These elements require that the person must be able to predict the harmful 
consequence and it must be possible to act in a different way, and this different act must be 
viable.89 ‘Viability’ means that the different options must be comparable in terms of the facility 
of access.90 
 
On the subject of intentional and unintentional causing of a violation of integrity, Bufacchi 
recognises that intention to cause harm is what many accept as the moral line which 
differentiates benevolent actions from malevolent actions, and which helps to clearly 
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distinguish between an act of violence and a mere accident.91 However, he recognises that there 
are ‘hard cases’ where a person’s integrity is violated as a result of conduct which is not merely 
accidental but the harmful consequence was not intended either.92 This will be the case when 
harm is a foreseeable and/or avoidable. Given that the person still experiences a violation, these 
hard cases make it necessary to relax the intention requirement of violence and replace it with 
the requirement of foreseeability of inevitable consequences of one’s actions.93 Bufacchi 
explains that ‘an act of violence occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or 
persons by an agent, and the suffering is either foreseeable and/or avoidable.’94 Following this 
approach helps to broaden the definition of violence to capture unintentional but foreseeable 
harm, it renders visible those harms that remain invisible under the narrow definition of 
violence, and visibility supports demands for justification and claims for accountability.95 
 
Drawing from Bufacchi’s general definition of violence it is clear that the ‘violence’ in 
‘obstetric violence’ concerns the violation of integrity of women within the context of obstetric 
care context. A woman’s physical and psychological integrity can be violated in many ways 
during obstetric ‘care’ and this means that the appropriation of women’s bodies and 
reproductive process is essentially only one act of many that constitute obstetric violence. Thus, 
medicalisation of childbirth without justification and consent is a type of obstetric violence 
rather than its definition. This approach exposes the fact that the current legal definition of 
obstetric violence, which seems to be widely supported by activists and researchers, is too 
narrow and this has caused certain acts of violence to be overlooked or remain undetected. 
 
I argue that one of the acts of obstetric violence being overlooked concerns the use of evidence-
based guidelines or recommendations to deny women access to non-clinically indicated care 
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and this denial causes them foreseeable harms. This is best illustrated by referring to the 
Maternal Request Caesarean Campaign.96 
 
In maternal request cases, women are requesting access to caesarean sections for reasons 
considered important to them. Access is being denied because evidence-based guidelines and 
recommendations reveal that there are no clinical indications supporting this mode of 
childbirth. The denial of access to caesarean sections runs the serious risk of long-term 
psychological harms related to the trauma experienced as a result of being compelled into a 
particular mode of childbirth. I characterise this as a form of obstetric violence because this 
scenario causes a violation of women’s psychological integrity. The violation occurs because 
of an omission on the part of attending healthcare providers. It constitutes violence because 
healthcare providers can predict this harmful consequence given that they consult with women 
antenatally and during this time women make their position in relation to vaginal birth clear. 
Healthcare professionals or Trusts can avoid violating women’s psychological integrity 
because the reason for the denial of care is grounded in clinical indication and not limited 
resources. This scenario falls within the ‘hard case’ category: The violation of integrity is not 
an intended consequence of compliance with guidelines, but it is not an accident either. 
Healthcare providers do not intend the consequence of childbirth-related psychological trauma, 
but this consequence is foreseeable and avoidable. Therefore, it constitutes an act of obstetric 
violence by omission. 
 
Embedding obstetric violence within broader debates about violence more generally reveals 
that pathologisation of childbirth without women’s consent and the Trust’s application of 
evidence-based guidelines to deny clinically non-indicated care are two sides of the same coin. 
In both instances women are infantilised, humiliated and subjected to the power of others. 
Leaving no woman behind: Making evidence-based guidelines more effective 
This chapter shows that scientifically sound evidence-based guidelines and the law can work 
together in particularly harmful ways for some pregnant or birthing women. For evidence-
based guidelines be an effective tool to tackle abuse, as presented by the WHO and others, they 
need to address or challenge the underlying causes of abuse. Obstetric violence research and 
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activism explains that the privileged position of medical knowledge and the unequal and 
undervalued position of women in society are the underlying causes of abuse during obstetric 
care. However, evidence-based guidelines do not address these causes on their own because 
they work with the privileged position of medical knowledge rather than challenge it. Thus, the 
effectiveness of guidelines is determined by those who apply the guidelines and their 
perceptions of women. The law allows this to occur and it will continue to occur until 
mechanisms of empowerment are developed for women to use when confronted with harmful 
application of evidence-based guidelines. 
 
Status quo needs to be challenged because some women are being left behind and their rights 
are being violated. An obstetric violence perspective is particularly helpful in this context 
because it disrupts medical privilege. It adopts a women’s perspective by bringing into focus 
their experiences and this facilitates the inclusion of women’s voices into spaces where they 
were silenced. It exposes harms that were once invisible or accepted as normal. Framing 
women’s experiences as a form of violence against women ignites international human rights 
law obligations on states to ‘take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of 
gender-based violence’.97 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women explains 
that appropriate and effective measures include legal measures such as penal sanctions, civil 
remedies and compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence.98 These 
should be employed together with other measures adopted to protect and prevent violence, such 
as public information and education programmes to change harmful attitudes, and to offer 
counselling and other support services to women who have experienced violence.99 
Importantly, the Committee confirms that a state may be responsible for private acts of violence 
if it fails to act with due diligence to prevent and investigate violence against women.100 The 
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Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence supports this position; it adopts a similar approach to state obligations in 
the context of violence against women.101 
 
The above demonstrates that if evidence-based guidelines are to secure their spot as effective 
tools in the fight against abuse during pregnancy and childbirth, they will have to be subject to 
women’s individual needs, as self-determined. The privileged position of medical knowledge 
should be used for women rather than against them. Further, international human rights law 
emphasises that violence against women needs to be tackled from multiple perspectives. This 
means two things: A health systems approach to abuse is not enough and women should have 
effective recourse in law. Consequently, when evidence-based guidelines leave some women 
behind and their integrity is violated as a result thereof, there must be a remedy in law available 
to them. The current position that courts have adopted towards evidence-based guidelines 
cannot be legitimately sustained. 
Conclusion 
Evidence-based guidelines play an important role in maternity care. They are promoted as 
being developed and implemented for the benefit of women, to overcome disrespect and abuse 
during pregnancy and childbirth. However, this chapter tells the story of women who are 
silenced, excluded from care, and experience violations to their psychological integrity because 
of the application of evidence-based guidelines and recommendations. Further, it showed that 
the law has little to offer by way of leverage over those making medical decisions that have 
such a negative impact on them. I argue that women’s experiences are not mere accidents or 
unfortunate but acceptable outcomes of ‘good medical practice’ or evidenced-based care. This 
is obstetric violence and this form of violence is facilitated by evidence-based guidelines 
because the guidelines allow the application of medical knowledge in harmful ways and they 
are used to justify violence against women. I suspect the reason why some of the flaws of 
evidence-based guidelines cannot be fully appreciated is because those promoting them do not 
consider abuse as a form of violence or they have a restrictively narrow understanding of the 
                                            
101 See arts 5 and 7. 
concept.102 The recognition of these circumstances as a form of violence against women ignites 
important state obligations. A state must consider all possible avenues to prevent and protect 
women from violence. Violence can be prevented by supporting the use of evidence-based 
guidelines to facilitate meaningful informed decision-making rather than allowing healthcare 
providers to use them make decisions for women. Further, the state should think creatively of 
legal ways to accommodate women’s diverse needs for care, particularly when healthcare 
providers attempt to override and silence them because evidence-based guidelines justify this 
approach.
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